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TOP SECRET

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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29 APR 1969

Mr. Richard Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter I have sent to ADM Moorer concerning the proposal made by ADM Hyland in CINCPACFLT.

In view of the recent USIB decision regarding reclassification of our satellite reconnaissance activities for projected Arms Control negotiations, a change in policy at this time appears remote. However, you may wish to have the COMIREX review this question.

I believe the most expeditious means of satisfying ADM Hyland's immediate requirements is to process them in accordance with the current contingency plan procedures. My staff is working with NAVINTCOM to provide assistance and to simplify submission of his requirements.

Sincerely,

*Joseph F. Carroll*

JOSEPH F. CARROLL  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

1 Enclosure  
Ltr to ADM Moorer

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DIA review(s) completed.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

ADM Thomas H. Moorer  
Chief of Naval Operations  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

29 APR 1969

Dear ADM Moorer:

I share your concern for providing the best possible support to our front line forces and I would like to reassure you that this is of paramount interest to us.

After reading ADM Hyland's letter there are several points which are pertinent, particularly as concerns our efforts to accomplish overall downgrading of segments of our satellite photography.

In response to U&S Commands' requirements, the USIB in May of 1967 considered a proposed change of policy which would have permitted release of KH-4 photography for use outside the TALENT-KEYHOLE system at the SECRET classification level. The paper recommended a change in national policy which would have acknowledged officially at the SECRET level that the US is conducting satellite reconnaissance and further it would have permitted attribution of intelligence to satellite reconnaissance. This in effect is what ADM Hyland proposed in alternative a. Secretary McNamara disapproved this paper stating that the advantages were not clear at that time preferring to wait until it would be advantageous for both the US and the Soviet Union to surface their satellite photography. In view of this decision, alternate methods had to be devised to obtain the needed usage of this photography. A method was devised whereby we could sanitize selected photography and permit its use outside the TALENT-KEYHOLE system on a restricted control basis. The USIB approved this procedure only in support of manned delivery elements identified with the SIOP and this became the first major step in permitting use of satellite

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photography at normal classification levels outside TALENT-KEYHOLE control. Although the requirement to support manned SIOP programs was apparent, it was even more apparent that the possibility was greater for implementation of contingency plans than for execution of the SIOP. In view of this and after obtaining a measure of experience in controlling the KH-4 photography outside the TALENT-KEYHOLE system in the SIOP, I proposed to the USIB that sanitized KH-4 be authorized for use in military programs other than SIOP. This would have permitted the SIO of the Commands to use these materials in contingency plans as he required. This proposal related directly to alternative b as stated by ADM Hyland. However, because of the number and diversity of the various plans within the Commands, it was a very difficult task to fully define the contingency plan requirements. The final result was the procedure approved by USIB whereby each plan or request would be reviewed on a case by case basis. This is the instruction promulgated in my letter of 7 November 1968 (Reference a of ADM Hyland's letter) and which ADM Hyland refers to as being excessively burdensome.

I feel that ADM Hyland is reading too much into the research requirements for submitting his request for use of the photography. A listing of the targets along with a brief identification of his plan and the benefits to be gained by using this photography is basically what is required. It would seem that most of the information required is available in his mission planning folders in which each target is listed along with the latest photography available. A perusal of these data and an indication of obviously outdated photography, poor quality, etc. is sufficient evidence to request use of KH-4. I will insure that procedures are streamlined so that submission of requirements in accordance with my letter of 7 November for contingency plans will not be unnecessarily burdensome.

Recently in connection with projected Arms Control negotiations with the USSR, the USIB again examined the possibility of downgrading our reconnaissance satellite operations and the associated photography. The position taken by the Board was that

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there should be no change in classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information derived from them.

As you know, the decision to restrict and control satellite operations and reconnaissance products was made by Presidential Directive and a change in that policy will require Presidential approval. On the other hand, it is within my authority within the USIB structure to devise ways and means of sanitizing sensitive intelligence by means of cover, blending, etc., and to use that intelligence at less sensitive classification levels. These are the steps I have taken to accomplish the needed use of KH-4 photography to meet limited needs and still operate within the necessary security restraints.

Because of the recent USIB position concerning reclassifying satellite reconnaissance activities and products, in the present environment and the various considerations involved in undertaking to effect the removal of the photography from the TALENT-KEYHOLE system, I believe the possibility of a policy change at an early time is remote. Therefore, I would recommend strongly that ADM Hyland submit his contingency plan requirements in accordance with the current procedures. I feel certain that his priority requirements for use of photography can be met expeditiously and I have instructed my Special Activities Office to assist NAVINTCOM in providing guidance to CINCPACFLT concerning submission of his requirements.

If in this process, contrary to our experience in other Commands, it is determined that the procedural requirements for sanitization authority is, indeed, unduly burdensome I will undertake through USIB to have them further streamlined to the extent that valid security considerations will permit.

Sincerely,



JOSEPH F. CARROLL  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

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